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We investigate the relationship between economic deregulation (delicensing), skill upgrad-
ing, and wage inequality during the 1980s and 1990s in India. We use a unique dataset on
India's industrial licensing regime to test whether industrial deregulation during the 1980s and
1990s played a role in generating demand for skilled workers, as measured by the employment
and wagebill shares of white-collar workers, and in raising the returns to skilled labor, as mea-
sured by the skill premium. Our analysis focuses not only on the dierence between licensed
and delicensed industries but also on the comparison of these dierences during the 1980s,
when India's external sector remained relatively closed to the world economy, and the 1990s,
when India underwent massive liberalization reforms and became increasingly integrated with
the global economy. We identify two main channels through which industrial delicensing af-
fects the demand for skills and wage inequality: capital- and output-skill complementarities.
Our analysis nds two important results. First, capital- and output-skill complementarities
existed for rms in both licensed and delicensed industries but were stronger in delicensed
industries both before and after 1991. The exception is output-skill complementarities with
respect to the skill premium, where delicensed industries experienced lower output-skill com-
plementarities compared to licensed ones both before and after 1991. Second, the contribution
of industrial delicensing to both types of complementarities was considerably higher during
the 1980s and much smaller after 1991. These results suggest that industrial delicensing bene-
ted skilled labor via capital- and output-skill complementarities during the 1980s, the decade
before India liberalized it's trade and investment regime. Thus, much of the increase in the
demand for and returns to skill as a result of capital- and output-skill complementarities, can
be attributed to domestic reforms during the pre-1991 period in India.
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21 Introduction
During the 1980s and 1990s, the Indian labor market experienced two dramatic changes.
First, there was a considerable widening of the skill wage gap, as shown in Figures 1 (average
nominal wages) and 2 (skill premium). Figure 1 shows the average nominal wages of white-
and blue-collar workers between 1980-81 and 1994-95.1 The average wage of white-collar
or skilled workers is always higher than those of blue-collar or unskilled workers. Further,
the divergence between these wages began during the mid-1980s and increased over time,
especially after 1991. The skill premium, which we dene as the ratio of the average white-
and blue-collar wage rates, declined during the early 1980s, remained relatively stable until
the late 1980s, and rose considerably after 1991. The second change that occurred in the
Indian labor market during this period was a large increase in the demand for skilled labor.
As shown in Figure 3, (wagebill and employment shares of white-collar workers) there was a
gradual increase in the share of the wagebill going to white-collar workers as well as in the
share of white-collar workers employed by rms during the 1980s. After 1991, the wagebill
and employment shares of white-collar workers rose sharply.
Together, Figures 1-3 reveal an interesting feature of India's labor market during the mid-
1980s and early 1990s { that the employment share of white-collar workers rose simultaneously
with the skill premium. Since the 1980s and 1990s also mark a period of widespread economic
reforms in India, it is reasonable to expect that these reforms may have played a role in
skill upgrading and wage inequality. Domestic sector reforms, which consisted of industrial
deregulation, began during the mid-1980s and continued after 1991.2 External sector reforms
consisted of the liberalization of trade and foreign investment and began in July 1991.
Industrial deregulation consisted of industrial delicensing reforms for certain industries
during the 1980s and 1990s. Delicensing meant freedom from constraints on output, inputs,
technology, and location as well as free entry into delincensed industries. Freedom from these
constraints allowed rms to take advantage of economies of scale, more ecient input combi-
nations, and new technology. Further, greater domestic competition as a result of free entry
into delicensed industries provided rms with incentives to innovate, increase productivity,
and improve product quality. If output-, capital-, and technology-skill complementarities ex-
ist, we would observe skill upgrading and increased wage inequality as a result of industrial
deregulation, ceteris paribus. External sector reforms, which consisted of trade and invest-
ment liberalization, would have a similar eect on skilled labor by increasing foreign compe-
tition for domestic rms and providing them with additional incentives to innovate, increase
productivity, and improve product quality. Again, in the presence of output-, capital-, and
technology-skill complementarities, we would observe increases in the demand for skilled labor
and a widening of the skill-wage-gap.
A large body of literature has established a link between external sector reforms, skill
upgrading, and wage inequality in India and other developing countries (Attanasio et al. 2004,
Cragg & Epelbaum 1996, Feenstra & Hanson 1996, 1997, 2003, Goldberg & Pavcnik 2004,
Gorg & Strobl 2002, Hanson 2003, Harrison & Hanson 1999, Pavcnik 2003, Verhoogen 2004).
For the case of India, Berman et al. (2005), Chamarbagwala (2006), Kumar & Mishra (2005),
1White- and blue-collar workers are dened as non-production and production workers, respectively.
2We use the term deregulation to capture the industrial delicensing reforms implemented during the 1980s and
1990s in India.
3Dutta (2005) all examine the relationship between trade liberalization, skill upgrading, and
wage inequality during the 1980s and 1990s. While these studies provide valuable insights
into the relationship between external sector reforms, skill upgrading, and wage inequality,
they don't allow for a link between domestic sector reforms and the demand for and return to
skills. Berman et al. (2005) use Indian industry-level data to examine the relationship between
output, capital, trade, and skill, but do not allow for a link between industrial deregulation
and skill. Sharma (2006) incorporates domestic deregulation in an analysis of rm behavior
and outcomes and provides evidence that domestic deregulation contributed to productivity
gains among Indian rms, though it does not address the eect of domestic sector reforms on
skill upgrading and wage inequality. Our work builds on Berman et al. (2005) and Sharma
(2006) by allowing for industrial deregulation as well as external sector reforms to in
uence
skill upgrading and wage inequality using rm-level data for India.
Our primary contribution is to investigate the relationship between domestic sector re-
forms, skill upgrading, and wage inequality in India. Incorporating domestic sector reforms,
which consisted of industrial deregulation, in an analysis of the demand for and return to
skills is particularly important for the case of India. Few of the previous studies on India's
labor market control for the changes in the 1980s, brought about by industrial delicensing,
and hence may provide biased estimates of the impact of trade liberalization on skill upgrad-
ing and wage inequality. Table 1 brings forward three important points that challenge the
predictions of other studies on India. First, the chronology of reforms was such that industrial
deregulation began during the mid-1980s and therefore well before the external sector reforms
were implemented in July 1991. Thus, industrial deregulation may have changed the domestic
manufacturing environment during the 1980s and 1990s, which may have, in turn, aected
the ability and incentives of Indian rms to respond to trade and investment liberalization
after 1991. Second, the industrial delicensing reforms of the 1980s were quite signicant with
respect to the percentage of manufacturing output that they aected. Cumulatively, 23% of
output and almost 23% of employment had been delicensed by 1990. These two points sug-
gest that ignoring pre-1991 changes in the licensing regime may provide misleading and biased
estimates of the impact of the 1991 reforms. Third, delicensing in 1991 was not \across the
board" as is the common assumption in most studies. In fact, 16% of manufacturing output
and 10% of employment were still under compulsory licensing post-1991. Some of these in-
dustries were gradually delicensed in 1993 and 1994. Therefore, studies that ignore the actual
chronology of industrial deregulation post-1991 may overstate the impact of the 1991 reforms.
Our results identify two main channels through which industrial delicensing aects the
demand for skills and wage inequality: capital- and output-skill complementarities. We nd
that capital- and output-skill complementarities existed for rms in both licensed and decli-
censed industries. These complementarities were, however, stronger in delicensed industries
both before and after 1991. With respect to the skill premium, however, delicensing decreased
output-skill complementarities during both periods. Even though industrial delicensing con-
tributed substantially to both capital- and output-skill complementarities during the 1980s,
the contribution of delicensing to these complementarities was negligible during the post-1991
period. Our results suggest that industrial delicensing beneted skilled labor via capital- and
output-skill complementarities before India liberalized trade and investment. Thus, much of
the increase in the demand for and returns to skill as a result of capital- and output-skill
complementarities, can be attributed to domestic sector reforms during the pre-1991 period
4in India.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the domestic and external sector
reforms during the 1980s and 1990s in India. Section 3 summarizes the mechanisms through
which skill upgrading and wage inequality can be aected by domestic and external sector
reforms. Section 4 describes our data, estimation, and identication strategy. We discuss our
results in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
2 Domestic and External Sector Reforms
Even though India's mixed economy framework mandated a role for private enterprise, the
government believed it was necessary to provide incentives to private rms to invest in desirable
industries and locations. Industrial licensing therefore evolved as a method for the Indian
government to to control private enterprise in India.3 A license was a document that permitted
a rm to begin or continue production in an industry and was issued by the Ministry of
Industry in New Delhi.
The licensing regime controlled entry into an industry and hence the amount of competi-
tion faced by a rm. The most important concern for the licensing committee while debating
a particular case was the \demand-supply situation" of the good { if it was felt that there
was enough existing capacity to satisfy projected demand then the application was rejected,
irrespective of the quality of the proposed good and the nature and productivity of the tech-
nology that it proposed to use. Another important facet was the type of the good. There
was a disdain for variety among policy-makers of the time and competition was thought to
be wasteful. Import and foreign exchange requirements were also important considerations
and a large number of applications were rejected because they required \too" much foreign
exchange. Thus, new projects were not assessed on the merit of their eciency, productivity,
or quality (Das 2000).
A license also specied the amount of output that a rm could produce. This was con-
ditional on the proposed location of the project and permission was required to change the
location of production. The exact nature of the product was also specied and either permis-
sion or a new license was needed to change the product mix. A rm's inputs and technology,
though not specied on the license, were also restricted. This is because the most crucial raw
materials { steel, cement, coal, fuel, and furnace oil { as well as licenses to import inputs {
including machinery and equipment { were controlled by the government with rms receiv-
ing annual allotments of these inputs for production. In fact, licensing requirements were
implemented primarily through the restricted allocation of these inputs to the rm. Based
on the specied output limit on its license, every rm was allotted a xed amount of these
inputs annually. Thus, it was dicult if not impossible for an entrepreneur to produce over
the specied output limit on his license.
Policy makers began realizing the crippling eect of the licensing regime on the Indian
economy during the 1960s and 1970s and several ad hoc measures were implemented during
this period.4 However, it was only during the 1980s that the government took substantial
3See Sharma (2006) for a detailed description of industrial licensing in India.
4The rst \delicensing" of rms occurred in 1966 and by 1969, 41 industries were delicensed. However in 1973,
these industries were licensed again and it was only in 1975 that the second phase of delicensing began, when 21
5steps in relaxing the licensing regime by \delicensing" certain industries. Table 1 shows the
percentage of manufacturing and factory output and value added that was delicensed during
the 1980s and 1990s. While this piece-meal approach to reforming industrial policy continued
through the 1980s, the Indian economy faced a severe balance of payment crisis in July 1991
and was forced to take loans from international organizations. It was at this time that the
biggest delicensing episode occurred, under pressure from these organizations. Almost all
industrial licensing was removed, other than for 16% of manufacturing output.
Along with this, there were massive external sector reforms in 1991, which consisted of
trade and investment liberalization. The trade policy reforms aimed at liberalizing and pro-
moting both exports and imports. As a result of lower taris, elimination of quotas and
import license requirements, and liberalization of technology imports, total exports and im-
ports increased dramatically during the 1990s. Exports were liberalized via the abolition of
export subsidies and controls while the liberalization of imports was implemented via a rapid
reduction in tari rates and the abolition of licensing and quantitative restrictions on most
imports except consumer goods. The average ad valorem tari rate fell from 125% in 1990 to
40% in 1999. Besides lower taris, non-tari barriers were reduced by eliminating quantitative
restrictions - quotas and import licensing requirements - particularly on capital and intermedi-
ate goods. In addition, technology imports were liberalized by eliminating technology license
requirements. Foreign direct investment (FDI) was liberalized to a limited extent, resulting in
an increase of FDI from $233 million to $3.3 billion during the 1990s. Besides these reforms,
the rupee was devalued by 22% (from Rs. 21.20 to Rs. 25.80 per U.S. dollar). The sheer
scale and scope of the reforms were so large that this reform episode has been the one that
has caught the attention of policy-makers and researchers alike.
The licensing regime aected rm-level productivity and costs through its control on both
the rm's textitability and incentives to innovate, reduce costs, use ecient input combi-
nations, adopt new technology, and exploit economies of scale. Direct controls on outputs
and inputs aected rms' abilities whereas indirect control of entry aected rms' incentives.
Even if direct controls were not fully implemented due to corruption, the eect of indirect
controls on incentives was substantial. Licensing restricted entry into most sectors and cre-
ated articial monopolies and oligopolies. The average four-rm concentration ratio in Indian
manufacturing in 1981 was 54% compared to 32% for the US in 1977. Even among developing
countries, India's concentration ratio was closer to Poland's (65% in 1988) rather than Brazil's
(32% in 1988).
3 Mechanisms of Skill Upgrading and Increased Wage
Inequality
Given the extent of India's licensing regime, it is reasonable to expect that industrial dereg-
ulation during the 1980s and 1990s may have played a role in raising the demand for and
returns to skill in the country. We explore several hypotheses which explain the mechanisms
through which domestic and external sector reforms may aect skills in less developed coun-
tries (LDCs). Hypotheses I and II relate both domestic and external sector reforms to the
industries accounting for 3% of manufacturing output were delicensed.
6demand for and returns to skill in LDCs. Hypotheses III and IV concern only external sector
reforms { that is, trade and investment liberalization.
The rst hypothesis (Hypothesis I) relates skill-biased change to increased demand for
skilled labor and a rising skill premium. According to this hypothesis, domestic and external
sector reforms increase the degree of competition faced by rms as a result of entry of domestic
rms as well as from foreign rms. Increased competition provides incentives for rms to
become more productive { that is, exploit economies of scale, utilize more ecient input
combinations, and adopt new technology. If these changes are complementary to skilled labor,
economic liberalization should result in skill upgrading and increased wage inequality. In
other words, in the presence of output-, capital-, and technology-skill complementarities, we
should observe skill upgrading and a widening skill-wage-gap after economic deregulation. The
existing literature focuses solely on trade liberalization and not on domestic sector reforms.
Wood (1995) argues that trade liberalization results in \defensive innovation" { that is, greater
competition from foreign rms may induce domestic rms in LDCs to either engage in R&D
or to adopt new and advanced technologies in order to secure their market share in the
domestic and international markets. Because of technology-skill complementarities, adoption
of modern technologies raises the demand for and returns to skilled labor. Acemoglu (2003)
describes how, as the result of trade liberalization in LDCs, increased capital goods imports
can lead to greater demand for skilled workers as a result of capital-skill complementarities,
thus increasing the skill-premium. Empirical support for this hypothesis is found by Attanasio
et al. (2004) for Colombia and by Harrison & Hanson (1999) for the case of Mexico. Gorg &
Strobl (2002) nd an increase in the relative wages of skilled labor in Ghana, brought about
by skill-biased technological change induced through imports of technology-intensive capital
goods or export activity. However, Pavcnik (2003) rejects this hypothesis for Chilean plants.
Berman et al. (2005) nd evidence of output- and capital-skill complementarities in Indian
industries during the 1980s and 1990s, though they exclude any potential eect of industrial
deregulation on skill upgrading and wage inequality.
Quality-upgrading by rms, as a result of greater competition, is the second hypothesis
(Hypothesis II). The basic argument is that domestic and external sector liberalization may
induce a quality upgrading of rms, where quality refers to either rm productivity or product
quality. Verhoogen (2004) nds strong support for this hypothesis for the case of Mexico where
greater exports as a result of the peso crisis resulted in better quality products being produced
by exporters. Because higher quality products require a higher proportion of skilled workers,
the relative demand for and returns to skilled labor increased. For India, Sharma (2006)
nds that rms that experienced delicensing also experienced higher productivity both before
and after the countrys external sector reforms of 1991 but does not examine the relationship
between reforms and skills. If higher rm-level productivity is complementary to skilled labor,
we would expect that there would be skill upgrading as well as higher returns to skilled labor
among Indian rms.
The third hypothesis (Hypothesis III) is based on the Stolper-Samuelson (SS) theorem in
the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model and relates solely to external sector reforms in trade.
The SS theorem predicts that trade liberalization will raise the demand for and returns to
the abundant factor of production { that is, unskilled labor in most LDCs. Even though at
rst glance this theorem predicts a decrease in the wage gap between skilled and unskilled
labor in LDCs, on closer inspection it shows that as protective import taris, quotas, and
7licenses are removed, the price of formerly protected goods will fall. By the SS Theorem,
a decrease in the relative price of a good will decrease the relative price of the factor used
intensively in the production of that good and increase the relative price of other factors.
Since in many LDCs { namely Colombia, Mexico, Brazil, and Morocco - the most protected
sectors were those that were intensive in unskilled labor, the SS theorem predicts that trade
liberalization in these countries should lower unskilled wages. Thus, an increased demand
for skilled labor and a widening skill-wage-gap support the predictions of the SS theorem in
these countries. India, on the other hand, had its highest protection levels { both, tari and
non-tari barriers { in human- and physical-capital-intensive sectors. Therefore, the rising
demand for and returns to skilled labor in India contradict the predictions of the SS theorem
for the country - which are an increase in the demand for and returns to unskilled labor and
an expansion of unskilled-labor-intensive sectors.
Global production sharing or outsourcing, which relates solely to external sector reforms
in investment, is the fourth hypothesis (Hypothesis IV) that has been provided to explain
the rising skill premium and demand for skilled labor in LDCs. Feenstra & Hanson (1996)
and Feenstra & Hanson (2003) argue that trade and investment liberalization on the part
of LDCs allows developed countries (DCs) to transfer the production of intermediate goods
and services to LDCs. For LDCs these activities are skill-intensive, which results in a greater
demand for and returns to skilled labor. Therefore, external sector reforms that promote
trade in manufactures and services and those that attract foreign direct investment can benet
skilled workers in LDCs. Feenstra & Hanson (1997) nd empirical support for this hypothesis
for the case of Mexico.
Our empirical analysis provides evidence that there was increased demand for and returns
to skilled labor during the 1980s { i.e. before India's external sector reforms were implemented
in 1991 { and that these increases occurred via capital- and output-skill complementarities.
These results support Hypotheses I and II and indicate that domestic sector reforms played
an important role in skill upgrading and wage inequality before India underwent massive
liberalization in international trade and investment. The lifting of microeconomic constraints
for domestic rms brought about greater competition and therefore more incentives for rms
to increase productivity and improve product quality. Our analysis does not allow us to
evaluate whether or not Hypotheses III and IV are supported by the Indian experience since
our dataset ends in 1994-1995, only three years after the onset of external sector reforms.
Moreover, due to lack of detailed data on industry-level trade protection, we do not include
a measure of trade liberalization but only compare how deregulation in
uenced skilled labor
during the pre- and post-1991 periods. Other studies, however, have shown that given the
large increase in the relative demand for and relative returns to skilled labor during the 1990s,
there is very little support for Hypothesis III (?).
4 Data, Estimation, and Identication Strategy
4.1 Empirical Analysis
Our data comes from two sources. In order to measure the extent of industrial deregulation
faced by a rm, we have collected a unique and detailed data set of industrial policy in India
8from the 1970s onwards. Using this data, we can identify which four-digit industry underwent
reform { that is, freedom from licensing requirements { in each year from 1970 until 1990.
The main source of this data was internal government publications and notications issued to
administrative ministries. Some commonly available publications like the Economic Survey
were also used. The second source of data is rm-level data from the Annual Survey of
Industries (ASI), conducted by the Central Statistical Organization (CSO), for the years
1980-81 until 1994-95. The survey covers all factories registered under the Factories Act of
1948 and only covers the formal sector in Indian manufacturing.5
We begin by investigating the relationship between domestic sector reforms, skill upgrad-
ing, and wage inequality prior to the 1991 external sector reforms. In doing so, we allow
for capital- and output-skill complementarities to exist. The translog production function
(Berman et al. 1994) provides the theoretical motivation for our estimation equation. To
focus on the pre-1991 relationship between industrial delicensing and skills, we restrict our
sample to only include the period before the external sector reforms of July 1991. Thus, we
only include rms during the period 1980-81 to 1990-91 and estimate the following equation.





+ 2ln(Ojt) + ijts (1)
Here Yijts is a measure of the relative demand for skilled labor or the skill premium for rm i
producing in industry j located in state s in year t. We use 2 alternate measures of the relative
demand for skilled labor { that is, the proportion of white-collar workers employed by the rm
and the rm's wagebill share of white-collar workers. The skill premium is measured as the
ratio of the white-collar wage rate to the blue-collar wage rate and captures the relative return
to skilled labor. White- and blue-collar workers are non-production and production workers re-
spectively. The employment share of white-collar workers is dened as
White CollarWorkersijts
TotalWorkersijts ,
the wagebill share of white-collar workers is dened as
White CollarWagesijts
TotalWagesijts , and the skill pre-
mium is dened as
White CollarWageRateijts
Blue CollarWageRateijts . Deregjt is an indicator that takes a value of 1 if





is the natural log of the rm's
capital-output ratio whereas ln(Ojt) is the natural log of the rm's output. Kjt is measured
as the capital stock of the rm, which is dened as the average of rm j's xed capital over
year t.6 Output is measured as rm j's real output in year t with industry-specic de
ators.
For Equation 1 and all subsequent regressions, we estimate robust standard errors, clustered
at the 4-digit industry-level.
Summary statistics of our key variables are presented in Table 2 for three important sub-
periods { 1980-81 to 1983-84, 1984-85 to 1990-91, and 1991-92 to 1994-95. The period 1980-
83 is pre-reform with no industrial or external sector policy changes. During 1984-90 there
was only industrial deregulation and the 1991-94 period was characterized by both industrial
5A factory is dened as units employing 20 or more workers. For our analysis, we use data on all establishments as
dened by the Industries Development and Regulation Act of 1951 since these rms were the ones that came under
the ambit of industrial licensing. These are rms that employ 50 or more workers and use power in the production
process or rms that employ 100 or more workers without using power during production.
6Fixed capital is dened as the \book value of assets in plant, machinery, land, and building". This denition
does not take account of in
ation or the economic value of capital owned by the rm.
9deregulation and external sector reforms. There is a steady rise in the average employment
and wagebill shares of white-collar workers and in the average skill premium from one period
to the next. The average capital-output ratio as well as the average output level are also
increasing considerably over this time period.
4.2 Identication
The coecient 1 in Equation 1 may provide biased and inconsistent estimates of the eect
of industrial delicensing on skill upgrading and wage inequality due to an omitted variable
bias. Our main explanatory variable, Deregjt, varies at the 4-digit industry-level of the
National Industrial Classication (NIC). Political economy factors like political aliation and
lobbying power, also at the industry-level, may determine whether or not industry j gets
delicensed in any given year t. If political power is also concentrated among highly skilled
industries, then there may be a spurious correlation between industrial deregulation and the
demand for and return to skilled labor, which would bias our estimate of 1. In order to
control for unobservables at the industry-level, we include 4-digit industry xed eects, j.
We also include year (
t) and state-level (s) xed eects to control for year- and state-specic
unobservables. Equation 2 includes industry, year, and state xed eects.





+ 2ln(Ojt) + j + 
t + s + ijts (2)
The nature of industrial delicensing in India provides yet another reason why 1 may be
biased. There may be a potential reverse causation between skill upgrading or wage inequality
and industrial delicensing. The reforms of the 1980s have been characterized by some as
\reforms by stealth". There was no consensus for economic reforms in the 1980s. More
importantly, it is clear from policy documents that the government was eager to portray
the changes of the 1980s as a continuation of the existing system even though these reforms
introduced dramatic changes that veered away from the high-regulation, socialist paradigm
that had been operating since the 1950s. Under these circumstances, it is possible that
the Indian government chose industries for deregulation based on certain industry-specic
characteristics that either raised the chances of success of the reforms or that minimized
social costs in case of failure. For example, the government may have chosen to delicense
more skill-intensive industries if government ocials expected skill-intensity to enhance the
success of the reforms or to minimize the employment eects of delicensing. In this case,
1 will not measure the eect of industrial delicensing on skills. Rather, it will capture the
selection of skill-intensive industries into delicensing. While industry xed eects may control
for some industry-specic characteristics that determined selection into delicensing, in order
to get reliable estimates we need within-industry variation in our delicensing measure.
In order to identify the eect of industrial deregulation on skill upgrading and wage inequal-
ity, we therefore interact the delicensing indicator with the capital-output ratio and output
level of a rm. Not only does this provide us with within-industry variation, but it also allows
us to examine the indirect eect of deregulation on skills via capital- and output-skill comple-
mentarities. We thus identify only the indirect eect of industrial deregulation { that is, the
interaction of deregulation with the capital-output ratio and output level of a rm { and not
the direct eect of industrial delicensing on skills.
10Our identication strategy coincides closely with an important institutional feature of the
licensing regime in India { there was an important size-based dierence in the application
of licensing provisions. In particular, rms that had assets in plant, machinery, land, and
building less than a threshold value were exempt from industrial licensing requirements. A
rm's capital-output ratio and output level is negatively correlated with a rm's exemption
status. Thus, rms with a higher capital-output ratio and output level were more likely to
have assets over the threshold value and were therefore more likely to be under the burden
of licensing provisions. Table 3 presents summary statistics of our key variables for rms
that were not exempt from industrial licensing (columns (2) and (3)) and for rms that were
exempt from licensing requirements (columns (4) and (5)). In all three periods, rms that
were not exempt from licensing had approximately three times the average capital-output
ratio compared to rms that were exempt from licensing. The average output level in non-
exempt rms was substantially larger than that in exempt rms. Moreover, in each period,
the average employment and wagebill shares of white-collar workers was higher in rms that
were not exempt from licensing. During the latter two periods, the average skill premium was
also higher in non-exempt rms.
Equation 3 includes interactions of the capital-output ratio and output level of a rm with
our industrial delicensing measure. This specication is equivalent to a dierence-in-dierences
estimation.
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(3)
Finally, we examine whether the eects of industrial deregulation on skills were dierent
during the pre- and post-1991 periods. To do so, we estimate Equation 4, which is equivalent
to a dierence-in-dierence-in-dierences estimation procedure.
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t + s + ijts
(4)
In Equation 4 we use a dierent measure of industrial deregulation. Dereg80j is an indi-
cator that takes a value of one if industry j was delicensed in any year during the 1980s and
zero otherwise. We use this alternate measure of industrial delicensing in order to isolate the
impact of delicensing during the 1980s from the eects of the post-1991 reforms. As described
in Section 2, the post-1991 reforms consisted of industrial delicensing as well as trade and
investment liberalization. Equation 4 therefore allows us to examine the eect of pre-1991 in-
dustrial delicensing on skills and how rms that were delicensed during the 1980s performed,
with respect to skill upgrading and wage inequality, both before and after the 1991 reforms.
11In all regressions we include an indicator of whether the rm is a factory or not7 We
also include indicators for the type of ownership and organization of a rm. For ownership
structure, we include two indicators { one for a joint sector rm and the other for a rm in
the private sector. The omitted group consists of rms in the public sector. We include two
indicators to capture overall dierences in organization structure { one for a public or private
limited company and the other for a co-operative society. The omitted group consists of rms
that are individual proprietorships or partnerships.8
5 Results
5.1 Results for the Pre-1991 Period
We present results of estimating Equation 2 in Table 4, which provides evidence of both
capital- and output-skill complementarities. A higher capital-output ratio as well as higher
output levels are associated with a larger employment (columns (3) and (4)) and wagebill
(columns (5) and (6)) share of white collar workers as well as with a higher skill premium
(columns (7) and (8)). A 1% increase in the capital-output ratio is associated with a 1.2 and
1.7 percentage point increase in the employment and wagebill shares of white-collar workers.
Output-skill complementarities are stronger { a 1% increase in the output level is associated
with a 2.2 and 3.4 percentage point increase in the employment and wagebill shares of white-
collar workers.9 There is a stronger relationship between the skill premium and the capital-
output ratio and output level of a rm. An increase of 2.2 and 4.0 percentage points in the
skill premium is associated with a 1% increase in the capital-output ratio and output level,
respectively. While there is a positive and signicant relationship between the capital-output
ratio and output level with respect to the employment and wagebill shares of white-collar
workers, the coecient estimates of Dereg cannot be identied specically as the eect of
industrial delicensing on these measures.
In order to control for industry selection into delicensing based on its skill-intensity, we need
within-industry variation in our delicensing measure. Interacting our delicensing measure with
the capital-output ratio and output level of a rm provides within-industry variation and allows
us to identify the eect of industrial delicensing on skill upgrading and wage inequality via
capital- and output-skill complementarities. Table 5 presents coecients and robust standard
errors from estimating Equation 3. Capital- and output-skill complementarities remain robust
across all industries, both licensed and delicensed.
The coecient estimate of Dereg can be interpreted as changes in skill upgrading and wage
inequality between industries as a result of industrial deregulation. There appears to be sub-
7A factory is a rm that employs 50 or more workers and uses power in the production process or one that
employs 100 or more workers without using power in the production process.
8The four major choices for organizing a business in India are individual proprietorships, partnerships, companies
(private or public limited), and co-operative societies. The individual proprietorship form consists of entrepreneurs
who have sole ownership of the establishment. Establishments with multiple owners or shareholders may be part-
nerships, companies, or co-operative societies. See Chapter 3 of Ramani et al. (2004) for a detailed discussion of
alternative business forms.
9Our results are qualitatively similar to Berman et al. (2005), who nd that output-skill complementarities are
substantially larger than capital-skill complementarities in Indian industries.
12stantial skill downgrading between industries as a result of industrial deregulation during the
1980s in India { the coecient estimates show a 9.4 and 10.1 percentage point decline in the
employment and wagebill shares of white-collar workers as a result of industrial deregulation.
These coecient estimates, however, may be contaminated as a result of selection into indus-
trial delicensing based on skill-intensity or other characteristics and only the within-industry
eects of delicensing via capital- and output-skill complementarities can be identied.
Table 6 presents coecient and F-test statistics in the rst panel and summarizes the degree
of capital- and output-skill complementarities for rms in licensed and delicensed industries
in the second panel. The coecient estimates of Equation 3 suggest that an increase of 8% in
the average capital-output ratio between 1980-81 and 1990-91 is associated with an 8.8 and 12
percentage point rise in the employment share of white-collar workers for rms in licensed and
delicensed industries, respectively. For the wagebill share of white-collar workers, these gures
are 13.6 and 17.6 percentage points for rms in licensed and delicensed industries, respectively.
The increases in the skill premium are 17.6 and 23.2 percentage points respectively for rms
in licensed and delicensed industries. Thus, industrial deregulation strengthened capital-skill
complementarities with respect to the employment and wagebill shares of white-collar workers
as well as the skill premium within industries during the 1980s in India. Specically, industrial
deregulation accounted for an additional 3.2, 4, and 5.6 percentage point rise in the employ-
ment share of white-collar workers, the wagebill share of white collar workers, and the skill
premium, respectively, via capital-skill complementarities.
The contribution of industrial delicensing to output-skill complementarities is even larger.
An increase of 10.7% in the average output level between 1980-81 and 1990-91 is associated
with a 22.5 and 32.1 percentage point increase in the employment share of white-collar workers
for rms in licensed and delicensed industries, respectively. For the wagebill share of white-
collar workers there is a 35.3 and 44.9 percentage point increase for rms in licensed and
delicensed industries, respectively. However, the skill premium increased more for rms in
licensed (43.9 percentage points) than in delicensed (36.4 percentage points) industries. Thus,
while industrial delicensing during the 1980s strengthened output-skill complementarities with
respect to the relative demand for skilled labor within industries, it weakened it for the rel-
ative return to skilled labor. Delicensed industries experienced an additional 9.6 percentage
point increase in both the employment and wagebill shares of white-collar workers and a 7.5
percentage point decrease in the skill premium via output-skill complementarities.
Overall, industrial deregulation appears to have increased the relative demand for skilled
workers via both capital- and output-skill complementarities during the 1980s in India. On the
other hand, industrial deregulation increased the relative return to skilled workers via capital-
skill complementarities but decreased the relative return to skilled labor through output-skill
complementarities.
5.2 Results for the Pre-and Post-1991 Period
Table 7 presents coecients and robust standard errors from estimating Equation 4 which
allows us to examine the contribution of industrial delicensing to capital- and output-skill
complementarities both before and after 1991. Tables 8 and 9 present coecient and F-test
statistics in the rst panel and summarize the degree of capital- and output-skill complemen-
tarities for rms in all and only delicensed industries in the second panel for the pre- and
13post-1991 periods, respectively. The degree of capital- and output-skill complementarities for
rms in all and delicensed industries during the pre-1991 period are almost identical to those
reported in Table 6. We therefore focus on comparing the extent of complementarities before
and after 1991.
Three observations are striking in comparing capital- and output-skill complementarities
before and after 1991. First, the degree of capital-skill complementarities are lower for rms
in licensed and delicensed industries in the post-1991 period compared to the pre-1991 period.
Among licensed industries, 1% increase in the capital-output ratio is associated with a 1.1,
1.7, and 2.2 percentage point increase in the employment share of white-collar workers, the
wagebill share of white-collar workers, and the skill premium during the pre-1991 period.
For the post-1991 period the corresponding gures are 0.7, 1.1, and 1.0 percentage point.
For delicensed industries these gures are 1.5 (0.7), 2.4 (1.2), and 3.3 (1.2) in the pre-1991
(post-1991) period.
Second, the degree of output-skill complementarities is also lower for licensed and deli-
censed rms in the post-1991 period compared to the pre-1991 period. A 1% increase in output
is associated with a 2.2 (2.0), 3.3 (3.1), and 4.2 (4.0) percentage point increase in the three
variables in the pre-1991 (post-1991) period for licensed industries. For delicensed industries
these gures are 3.1 (2.4), 4.3 (3.4), and 3.7 (3.0) in the pre-1991 (post-1991) period.
Third, if both domestic and external sector reforms are expected to increase the demand
for and returns to skilled labor, then one should expect higher capital- and output-skill com-
plementarities in the post-1991 period, when industries underwent delicensing as well as trade
liberalization, compared to the pre-1991 period, when only delicensing was in eect. Con-
trary to expectation, industrial delicensing strengthened the demand for skilled labor more in
the pre-1991 than the post-1991 period. A 1% increase in the capital-output ratio is associ-
ated with an additional 0.4, 0.7, and 1.1 percentage point increase for delicensed compared
to licensed industries in the employment share of white-collar workers, the wagebill share of
white-collar workers, and the skill premium during the pre-1991 period. For the post-1991
period these gures are 0.0, 0.1, and 0.2. Even though these gures are low in magnitude, the
8% (3.7%) average increase in the capital-output ratio between 1980-81 and 1990-91 (1991-
92 and 1994-95) indicates an additional 3.2 (0.0), 5.6 (0.4), and 8.8 (0.7) percentage point
increase for delicensed compared to licensed industries with respect to the three variables.
The same pattern is observed for output-skill complementarities. A 1% increase in output
is associated with an additional 0.9 (0.4) and 1.0 (0.3) percentage point increase for delicensed
compared to licensed industries in the employment and wagebill shares of white-collar workers
during the pre-1991 (post-1991) period. Given an average increase of 10.7% (3%) in output
during the pre-1991 (post-1991) period, there was an additional 9.6 (1.2) and 10.7 (0.9) per-
centage point increase for delicensed compared to licensed industries in the employment and
wagebill shares of white-collar workers during the pre-1991 (post-1991) period. With respect
to the skill-premium, output-skill complementarities were lower in delicensed compared to
licensed industries in both the pre- and post-1991 period, though the dierential widened
during the post-1991 period.10
10One reason for the decline in the strength of capital- and output-skill complementarities in the 1990s could lie in
the short time span of our data for the 1990s { rms may take time to adjust to major policy changes such as trade
and investment liberalization. Thus, data that extends into the late 1990s is required to conduct a more rigorous
comparison of the contribution of industrial deregulation to skill upgrading and wage inequality during the 1980s
146 Conclusion
In this paper we use disaggregated data on rm-level employment as well as on industrial
deregulation to analyze a puzzling nding. Nearly 15 years after major industrial and trade
reforms took place in India, the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers has risen,
contrary to the predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade. One possi-
ble explanation may be that increased competition induces rms to innovate, upgrade their
technology, and increase their output levels in order to take advantage of economies of scale,
leading to an increase in the demand for skilled labor. Using data spanning India's industrial
deregulation in the 1980s as well as the major trade reforms of the 1990s we analyze the
behavior of the employment share of skilled workers, the wagebill share of skilled workers, and
the skill premium (ratio of skilled wage to unskilled wage). The chronology of Indian reforms,
with piece-meal industrial deregulation in the 1980s and external sector reforms in the 1990s,
allows us to separate the eects of domestic and external reforms.
We nd that for the 1980s capital-skill and output-skill complementarities exist for rms
in all industries, but are stronger in industries that were delicensed. The exception is output-
skill complementarities, which are weaker with respect to the skill premium in delicensed
industries. Strikingly, there seems to be a decline in the extent of complementarities in the
years immediately following the massive reforms of 1991 and these results are surprising given
the extensive external sector reforms that were implemented in 1991. Perhaps more extensive
data, that goes well into the late 1990s, is needed since it may have taken several years before
India's external sector reforms beneted skilled labor.
Our regression results as well as simple diagrammatic analysis conrm that an increasing
trend in the relative demand for skilled workers preceded the external sector reforms of 1991
and that industrial deregulation in India may have played a role in this. Our results therefore
support Hypotheses I and II, described in Section 3. Once microeconomic constraints were
lifted from rms, they could invest in more capital as well as produce more output and take
advantage of economies of scale. Thus, it is not surprising that both capital and output
play important roles in skill upgrading. Increased competition, brought about by industrial
delicensing during the 1980s, appears to have provided rms with greater incentives to increase
productivity and prodcut quality, thereby beneting skilled workers in India.
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To compute these gures we use delicensing and rm-level
data at the 4-digit level of the National Industrial Classi-
cation (NIC).
21Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable 1980-81 to 1983-84 1984-85 to 1990-91 1991-92 to 1994-95
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Employment Share 0.28 0.35 0.31 0.37 0.36 0.41
Wagebill Share 0.25 0.21 0.26 0.21 0.30 0.22
Skill Premium 1.78 1.08 1.72 1.02 1.83 1.09
Capital-Output Ratio 12.21 30.42 19.43 44.98 36.78 94.11
Real Output 301 3240 473 4535 619 4994
Number of rms 194056 321814 189851
Source: Annual Survey of Industries (1980-81 to 1994-95) and industrial deregulation data collected by the authors. Real
output is in thousands of 1993-94 Rupees.
22Table 3: Summary Statistics for Non-Exempt and Exempt Firms
Variable Non-Exempt Firms Exempt Firms
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1980-81 to 1983-84
Employment Share 0.48 0.35 0.28 0.35
Wagebill Share 0.39 0.15 0.25 0.21
Skill Premium 1.73 0.80 1.81 1.08
Capital-Output Ratio 19.45 6.50
Real Output 10900 26700 170 641
Number of rms 2542 191514
1984-85 to 1990-91
Employment Share 0.49 0.38 0.31 0.38
Wagebill Share 0.40 0.17 0.27 0.21
Skill Premium 1.84 0.94 1.76 1.04
Capital-Output Ratio 28.92 10.17
Real Output 12000 29700 243 821
Number of rms 6336 315478
1991-92 to 1994-95
Employment Share 0.54 0.40 0.37 0.41
Wagebill Share 0.44 0.17 0.31 0.22
Skill Premium 1.95 1.07 1.86 1.09
Capital-Output Ratio 58.09 18.08
Real Output 15200 32000 336 1141
Number of rms 3636 186215
Source: Annual Survey of Industries (1980-81 to 1994-95) and industrial deregulation data collected
by the authors. Real output is in thousands of 1993-94 Rupees.
23Table 4: OLS Results of Equation 2: Industrial Deregulation, Skill Upgrading, and Wage Inequality
in India, Pre-1991
Variable Coecient Employment Wagebill Skill
Share of Share of Premium
White-Collar White-Collar
Workers Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dereg 1 0.006*** 0.005* 0.002
[0.002] [0.003] [0.007]
ln(K=O) 2 0.012*** 0.017*** 0.022***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.004]
ln(O) 3 0.022*** 0.034*** 0.040***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.004]
Constant  -0.080*** -0.142*** -0.055
[0.021] [0.023] [0.058]
Industry Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 474976 475173 414907
R-squared 0.23 0.27 0.11
Source: Annual Survey of Industries (1980-81 to 1990-91) and industrial deregulation data collected by the authors.
The omitted year is 1980-81. Industry xed eects are at the 4-digit NIC level. All regressions include indicators for
whether or not the rm is a factory and for the type of ownership and organization. The omitted ownership structure
is public sector rms and the omitted organization consists of individual proprietorship and partnership rms. Robust
standard errors, clustered at the 4-digit industry-level, are in parentheses. A *, **, and *** represent signicance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
24Table 5: OLS Results of Equation 3: Industrial Deregulation, Skill Upgrading, and Wage Inequality
in India, Pre-1991
Variable Coecient Employment Wagebill Skill
Share of Share of Premium
White-Collar White-Collar
Workers Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dereg 1 -0.094*** -0.101*** 0.06
[0.024] [0.031] [0.064]
ln(K=O) 2 0.011*** 0.017*** 0.022***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.005]
ln(O) 3 0.021*** 0.033*** 0.041***
[0.002] [0.003] [0.005]
Dereg  ln(K=O) 4 0.004*** 0.005** 0.007
[0.001] [0.002] [0.005]
Dereg  ln(O) 5 0.009*** 0.009*** -0.007
[0.002] [0.003] [0.006]
Constant  -0.069*** -0.131*** -0.064
[0.022] [0.025] [0.060]
Industry Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 474976 475173 414907
R-squared 0.23 0.27 0.11
Source: Annual Survey of Industries (1980-81 to 1990-91) and industrial deregulation data collected by the authors.
The omitted year is 1980-81. Industry xed eects are at the 4-digit NIC level. All regressions include indicators for
whether or not the rm is a factory and for the type of ownership and organization. The omitted ownership structure
is public sector rms and the omitted organization consists of individual proprietorship and partnership rms. Robust
standard errors, clustered at the 4-digit industry-level, are in parentheses. A *, **, and *** represent signicance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
25Table 6: Tests and Complementarities from Equation 3: Pre-1991
Null Hypothesis Employment Wagebill Skill
Share of Share of Premium
White-Collar White-Collar
Workers Workers
Coecients and Test Statistics
Firms in Licensed Industries
H0 : 2 = 0 0.011*** 0.017*** 0.022***
[188.86] [120.16] [22.62]
H0 : 3 = 0 0.021*** 0.033*** 0.041***
[107.75] [165.24] [74.20]
Firms in Delicensed Industries
H0 : 2 + 4 = 0 0.015*** 0.022*** 0.029***
[141.12] [164.67] [73.79]
H0 : 3 + 5 = 0 0.030*** 0.042*** 0.034***
[380.74] [524.70] [40.11]
Complementarities
Firms in Licensed Industries
Change in Average (K=O) = 8% 0.088 0.136 0.176
Change in Average (O) = 10.7% 0.225 0.353 0.439
Firms in Delicensed Industries
Change in Average (K=O) = 8% 0.120 0.176 0.232
Change in Average (O) = 10.7% 0.321 0.449 0.364
Source: Annual Survey of Industries (1980-81 to 1990-91) and industrial deregulation data collected by the authors.
F-statistics are presented in parentheses. The F-critical value with 1 restriction at the 1% level of signicance is 6.63.
26Table 7: OLS Results of Equation 4: Industrial Deregulation, Skill Upgrading, and Wage Inequality
in India, Pre- and Post-1991
Variable Coecient Employment Wagebill Skill
Share of Share of Premium
White-Collar White-Collar
Workers Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dereg80 1 -0.103*** -0.117*** 0.028
[0.025] [0.032] [0.061]
Post91 2 0.040*** 0.045*** -0.098***
[0.011] [0.016] [0.010]
ln(K=O) 3 0.011*** 0.017*** 0.022***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.005]
ln(O) 4 0.022*** 0.033*** 0.042***
[0.002] [0.003] [0.005]
Dereg80  Post91 5 0.070*** 0.089*** 0.070*
[0.017] [0.022] [0.042]
Dereg80  ln(K=O) 6 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.011**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.005]
Dereg80  ln(O) 7 0.009*** 0.010*** -0.005
[0.002] [0.003] [0.005]
Post91  ln(K=O) 8 -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.012***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.004]
Post91  ln(O) 9 -0.002** -0.002* -0.002
[0.001] [0.001] [0.003]
Dereg80  Post91  Ln(K=O) 10 -0.004** -0.006** -0.009*
[0.002] [0.003] [0.005]
Dereg80  Post91  Ln(O) 11 -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.005
[0.001] [0.002] [0.003]
Constant  -0.070*** -0.135*** -0.081
[0.022] [0.026] [0.059]
Industry Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 650469 650767 574990
R-squared 0.24 0.27 0.10
Source: Annual Survey of Industries (1980-81 to 1994-95) and industrial deregulation data collected by the authors. The omitted year is
1980-81. Industry xed eects are at the 4-digit NIC level. All regressions include indicators for whether or not the rm is a factory and
for the type of ownership and organization. The omitted ownership structure is public sector rms and the omitted organization consists
of individual proprietorship and partnership rms. Robust standard errors, clustered at the 4-digit industry-level, are in parentheses. A
*, **, and *** represent signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
27Table 8: Tests and Complementarities from Equation 4: Pre-1991 Period
Employment Wagebill Skill
Share of Share of Premium
White-Collar White-Collar
Workers Workers
Coecients and Test Statistics
Firms in Licensed Industries
H0 : 3 = 0 0.011*** 0.017*** 0.022***
[144.81] [92.39] [23.00]
H0 : 4 = 0 0.022*** 0.033*** 0.042***
[107.59] 163.03] 83.70]
Firms in Delicensed Industries
H0 : 3 + 6 = 0 0.015*** 0.024*** 0.033***
[140.71] [180.92] [107.94]
H0 : 4 + 7 = 0 0.031*** 0.043*** 0.037***
[412.66] [572.81] [54.75]
Complementarities
Firms in Licensed Industries
Change in Average (K=O) = 8% 0.088 0.136 0.176
Change in Average (O) = 10.7% 0.235 0.353 0.449
Firms in Delicensed Industries
Change in Average (K=O) = 8% 0.120 0.192 0.264
Change in Average (O) = 10.7% 0.332 0.460 0.396
Source: Annual Survey of Industries (1980-81 to 1994-95) and industrial deregulation data collected by the authors.
F-statistics are presented in parentheses. The F-critical value with 1 restriction at the 1% level of signicance is 6.63.
The F-critical value with 1 restriction at the 1% level of signicance is 3.78.
28Table 9: Tests and Complementarities from Equation 4: Post-1991 Period
Employment Wagebill Skill
Share of Share of Premium
White-Collar White-Collar
Workers Workers
Coecients and Test Statistics
Firms in Licensed Industries
H0 : 3 + 8 = 0 0.007*** 0.011*** 0.010***
[54.37] [68.70] [19.33]
H0 : 4 + 9 = 0 0.020*** 0.031*** 0.040***
[110.73] [193.81] [84.61]
Firms in Delicensed Industries
H0 : 3 + 6 + 8 + 10 = 0 0.007*** 0.012*** 0.012***
[31.50] [54.00] [13.14]
H0 : 4 + 7 + 9 + 11 = 0 0.024*** 0.034*** 0.030***
[236.66] [332.10] [57.74]
Complementarities
Firms in Licensed Industries
Change in Average (K=O) = 3.7% 0.026 0.041 0.037
Change in Average (O) = 3% 0.060 0.093 0.120
Firms in Delicensed Industries
Change in Average (K=O) = 3.7% 0.026 0.044 0.044
Change in Average (O) = 3% 0.072 0.102 0.090
Source: Annual Survey of Industries (1980-81 to 1994-95) and industrial deregulation data collected by the authors.
F-statistics are presented in parentheses. The F-critical value with 1 restriction at the 1% level of signicance is 6.63.
The F-critical value with 1 restriction at the 1% level of signicance is 3.78.
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